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 Abstract 
The conventional view is that Americans work longer hours than Germans and other 
Europeans but when time in household production is included, overall working time is 
very similar on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans spend more time on market work 
but German invest more in household production. This paper examines whether 
these differences in the allocation of time can be explained by differences in the 
incentive structure, this is by the tax-wedge and differences in the wage differentials, 
as economic theory suggests. Its analysis of unique time-use data reveals that the 
differences in time-allocation patterns can indeed be explained by economic 
variables. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Nach allgemeiner Auffassung arbeiten Amerikaner länger pro Jahr als Deutsche oder 
andere Europäer. Wenn jedoch die Arbeit im Haushalt einbezogen wird, ist die 
Gesamtarbeitszeit auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks fast gleich. Amerikaner leisten 
mehr Arbeitsstunden in bezahlter Arbeit, Deutsche investieren mehr Arbeitsstunden 
in Hausarbeit. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob diese unterschiedliche Arbeitszeitver-
teilung durch unterschiedliche Anreizstrukturen erklärt werden kann; das heißt 
Steuerzwänge und Lohn-/Gehaltsunterschiede, wie dies wirtschaftstheoretische 
Überlegungen nahe legen. Die Analyse von zeitgleichen Daten ergibt, dass Arbeits-
zeitverteilungsmuster tatsächlich durch ökonomische Variablen erklärt werden kön-
nen. 
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I Introduction 
Statistics on hours spent in market work suggest that Americans work much 
longer hours than Germans and Europeans in general. In 1995 the average 
American employee worked 1952 hours annually compared to just 1561 hours 
for the German employee (OECD 1998)1. This is a reversal of past trends, 
when the US led the move to shorter working hours. The 40-hour, 5-day 
working week with paid vacations is an all-American 'invention', which Europe 
adopted in the 1950s and 1960s. In the early 1970s the average adult German 
(aged 15 to 64 years) was spending about 13% more hours in employment than 
the average American, which is the combined effect of higher employment 
population rates and longer working hours in Germany. By the mid-1990s the 
working hours of the average adult German had fallen by about 25%, while the 
working hours of the average adult American were about 20% longer than in 
1970. In other words, in 1995 Americans were spending on average 43% more 
time on market work than Germans.2 Possible explanations for this difference in 
hours worked include differences in (1) culture (illustrated by labels like the 
'overworked American' and 'leisure park Germany'), (2) income levels (leisure 
as a superior good), and (3) the division of labor related to the structure of 
incentives to outsource activities from households.3  
(1) Culture is probably one of the most fundamental variables influencing the 
organization of economies in different countries but culture changes only 
very slowly. If German culture makes Germans to prefer shorter working 
hours and American culture makes Americans prefer longer hours, it is 
difficult to explain why the pattern in working time has changed. 
Furthermore, the surveys of the International Social Science Program 
(ISSP) show that the desires to participate in market work are very similar 
among German and American women. 59% of the German women and 
63% of the American women disagreed with the statement ‘A job is just a 
way of earning money –no more’, which may indicate that the ‘soft’ variables 
are of similar magnitude in both countries.  
                                            
1  In their overview of time-use research Juster and Stafford (1991) mention that ‘.. –labor 
supply hours- turns out to be quite poorly measured in conventional studies, and appears 
to be much better measured in time diary studies.’ (see also below) 
2  Calculations are based on OECD Labor Force Statistics and various issues of OECD 
Employment Outlook. 
3  It may also be that collective bargaining favors shorter working hours against the 
employees' will. This, however, seems not to be the case, since Bell and Freeman (1996) 
find workers in the US and in Germany equally satisfied with their respective working 
hours, with the Germans having a slight preference for shorter hours and the Americans 
for longer hours. 
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(2) Income is another potential explanation for the working time difference. If 
leisure is a superior good, the country with the higher income would be 
expected to work shorter hours.4 However, all the estimates show that the 
income level of US citizens is above the (West-) German level. The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS 1998:10), for example, estimates that West-German 
per capita income in 1996 was 80% of the US figure.5 According to the 
income hypothesis, therefore, the US should work shorter hours than 
Germany. 
(3) The third possible explanation (concerning the division of labor) refers to a 
broader concept of work, which includes not only hours spent in gainful 
market employment but also hours spent in household production. 'At the 
heart of the theory is an assumption that households are producers as well 
as consumers; they produce commodities by combining inputs of goods and 
time according to the cost-minimization rules of the traditional theory of the 
firm' (Becker 1965: 516). In principle, households can choose between 
gainful employment and the purchase of goods and services in the market 
on the one hand, and self-provision of these goods and services via 
household production on the other. The choice of products to be purchased 
in markets and goods to be provided via household production will be 
influenced by the relative costs of these two alternatives. In general, market 
provision will be preferred to household production if the productivity 
differentials between these two modes of provision are high and/or if the 
differentials between the individual's own wage and the wage of the 
professional are high and the wedge is small.  
It is well known that the US has a much more dispersed wage distribution than 
Germany and that non-wage labor costs are largely obligatory and proportional 
to the wage in Germany, whereas legal non-wage labor costs are lower in the 
US and effective non-wage labor costs are disproportional to wages. In the US 
many low-skill jobs provide only the legal minimum level of social security, 
whereas many skilled jobs offer similar social security as in Germany (Freeman/ 
Schettkat 1999). In addition, income taxes and sales taxes (valued-added tax in 
Germany) are higher in Germany, creating a bigger tax-wedge there than in the 
US. For this reason, it may be more attractive for German households to 
provide certain services6 themselves ('in-house') rather than to purchase them 
in the market, whereas it may be better for Americans to purchase services in 
                                            
4  Linda Bell and Richard Freeman (1996) explain 'why Americans work harder' (that is, 
longer hours) on the basis of a tournament model. In the US, wage dispersion within any 
given group is much wider than in Germany (see Freeman/ Schettkat 2000) and thus the 
incentive for Americans to work harder in order to 'move ahead in the tournament' is 
higher. According to this hypothesis, effort pays off more in the US in the long-run. 
5  The figures used refer to market incomes not including income from self-production, which 
would have to be included in a more comprehensive income measure (Eisner 1988). 
6  The choice between market sourcing and self-provision will generally have to be made in 
relation to services rather than goods, because in the case of goods the productivity 
differentials between the two modes of provision are usually big (see below). 
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the market and work longer hours in gainful employment. In other words, more 
services should be produced in markets in the US, whereas similar services 
should be provided in household production in Germany.  
According to the division of labor hypothesis, both time spent in gainful 
employment and time spent in household production should be taken into 
account when evaluating differences in working hours between the US and 
Germany. This measure provides a very different picture of hours worked in the 
two economies. Table 1 shows that on average Americans and Germans spend 
roughly the same hours working, but American spend more time in market work 
while Germans spend more hours in household production. Americans do not 
work longer hours than Germans overall, but they allocate a larger share of 
working time to gainful employment and invest less in self-provision.  
 
Table 1: Time-use in the US and in Germany, mean hours per week, 18-64 years7 
US Germany US Germany time-use category 
Men women 
   
total working time 53.2 53.1 52.2 53.8 
  market work 39.1 35.2 25.4 17.7 
  household production 14.1 17.9 26.8 36.1 
     
personal time/ leisure 114.4 113.7 115.4 113.3 
   voluntary work 1.0 1.5 .8 .9 
     
total hours per week  168 168 168 168 
 
Source: American-German Time-Use Data. For details see data section in Appendix I. 
Market work includes: actual time at work (including breaks), commuting time. 
Household production includes: child care, housework (cleaning, preparation of meals, 
household maintenance). 
Personal time/ leisure includes: grooming, eating, sleeping, leisure. 
Economic theory is undetermined with respect to the effect of wages on labor 
supply but offers a clear prediction of the effect of productivity differentials, 
wage differentials and the wedge on the distribution of overall working hours 
between gainful employment and household production. Building on the seminal 
work by Gary Becker (1965) and Reuben Gronau (1977), this paper develops a 
                                            
7 Distribution of employment statuses in Germany in 1991/92 and the US in 1993/94 
 total employed full-time part-time not employed 
 Germany 
Men 100.0 81.7 79.0 2.7 18.3 
Women 100.0 55.5 36.3 19.5 44.2 
 USA 
Men 100.0 84.6 76.4 8.0 15.6 
Women 100.0 68.8 54.0 14.8 31.2 
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model of household production, investigates the incentive structure in the US 
and in Germany and analyzes time-use patterns in Germany and the US using 
unique time-use data.  
II A simple model of household production  
A household's decision to produce goods and services itself (self-provision) or 
to purchase those products in markets (market provision) will depend on the 
relationship between opportunity costs and market costs. The opportunity costs 
of one hour of self-provision are the foregone earnings, i.e. the gross wage 
minus taxes (including social security contributions).8 The market-cost 
equivalent to one hour of self-provision depends on the ratio of productivity in 
self-provision (As) over that in market provision (Am) times the gross labor costs 
(gross wages plus social security contributions of employers and taxes like VAT 
or sales taxes) plus the overheads of the professional organization [wm * (1 + tm 
+ µ)].  
 
Opportunity costs for one hour of self-production (hs): 
(1 )s sOC w t= −          (1.1) 
 
Market-cost equivalent of one hour of self-production:9 
(1 )s p m
m
AMC w t
A
µ= ∗ + +         (1.2) 
 
Where: OC = opportunity costs, ws = own wage, wp = wage for a professional, t = tax 
rate, MC = market costs, A = productivity (A = Q/h; Q = quantity, h = hours), µ = 
overhead costs, profits, s = subscript for self-provision, m = subscript for market 
provision, Am = f(hs). 
                                            
8  Social security contributions may actually be seen as an insurance rather than a tax. 
However, the stronger the redistribution component of social security, the more strongly 
the contributions resemble a form of taxation. For simplicity's sake, this paper treats social 
security contributions as a form of taxation.   
9  Note that in this expression the market costs are standardized to the equivalent output of 
one hour in household production. Assuming that households rank activities according to 
the of productivity in self-provision over that in market provision, Am may be regarded as a 
function of time spent in household work [Am = f(hs)]. 
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Assuming that self-provision and market provision are perfect substitutes10, 
the household will spend the maximum possible hours in self-provision until the 
opportunity costs equal the market-cost equivalent (OC = MC). Since the wedge 
[(1-ts) / (1+tm+µ)] always shifts the odds in favor of self-provision, it needs to be 
balanced either by a positive difference between the own wage and the wage of 
the professional provider (ws > wm) or by higher productivity in professional 
production than in self-provision (Am > As). Productivity differentials between 
self-provision and professional provision will vary between different products. In 
some cases As > Am but in many other cases As < Am. It is convenient to 
assume that As is constant (i.e. does not change in response to the time spent 
in household production) but that Am differs in various activities. Then if 
households rank individual products according to the difference between 
market-cost equivalents and opportunity costs so that products with the highest 
difference are produced first, those with the second highest difference next etc., 
the ratio As/Am will be a decreasing function with respect to hours spent in self-
provision (hs).11  
The household production function which is the integral over the market-
cost equivalent curve (MC, equation 1.2, the equivalent market price for the 
products that can be produced in one hour of household production) will then be 
an upward sloping function with diminishing marginal returns to self-provision. 
Assuming that own wages and the wages for market provision are independent 
of hours worked and that taxes, social security contributions, overheads and 
profits are constant, the household production function (HPF) will be: 
(1 ) ln (1 )s p m s s m p m
m
AHPF w t dh a A A w t
A
µ µ= ∗ + + ∗ = + ∗ + +∫    | Am ≥ 1  (1.3) 
where a = 0 (the household production function will start at the origin), Am= 
f(hs). 
The household production function will have a steep slope for the first few 
hours spent in household production, when productivity in market provision is 
low, and will flatten out as hours in household production rise and productivity in 
market provision increases.12 Self-provision is extended to the point where the 
opportunity costs are higher than the market-price equivalent and the household 
                                            
10  Pollak/ Wachter (1975) emphasize that time spent in work activities may provide utility 
directly and these may differ in market work and in household production. This analysis is 
limited to household activities for which a close market substitute exists (household 
production in a narrow sense), where the joint production problem is similar to that in 
market work. 
11  This presentation is related to the "stage-model" of household  vs. market production 
developed by Luis Locay (1990), who argues that increases in the productivity of market 
production explain the historical shift of production from households to markets. 
12  One may argue that the professional is always more productive than the self-provider, but 
indivisibility may either lead to overly high costs of market provision (low productivity; for 
example, hiring someone just to clear the breakfast table). 
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will prefer gainful employment and market provision to further household 
production from this point on. Incorporating the term w tp m( )1+ + µ  into the 
opportunity cost function makes the dependence of the household's time 
allocation on the wage differences and the tax-wedge more visible in the inter-
country comparison. A bigger wedge and/or a lower wage difference between 
the own the professional wage will flatten the wage-wedge curve and will lead to 
a higher share of time spend in household production (see Figure 1). The 
household will be indifferent between self-provision and market provision if the 
opportunity costs of self-provision over market provision are equal to one:  
(1 ) 1
(1 )
s s m
p m s
w t AOC
MC w t Aµ
−= ∗ ∗ =+ +        (1.4) 
In equilibrium, therefore, opportunity costs (OC) equal market costs (MC) and 
the wage-wedge curve is a tangent to the production function which slope is the 
ratio (As / Am). 
w
w
t
t
A
A
s
p
s
m
s
m
* ( )
( )
1
1
−
+ + =µ           (1.5) 
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Figure 1: Household production versus market provision 
 
As long as self-provision and market provision are regarded as perfect 
substitutes, the overall income function will first consist of the household 
production function (HPF) and then of the market income or opportunity cost 
function (MC). The division of time between self-provision and market work will 
not depend on income preferences if maximizing income requires some 
combination of self-provision and market provision.13 In other words, as long as 
the indifference curve is not a tangent to the household production function, the 
following very clear conclusions can be drawn from the above model: 
 
1. The bigger the wedge, the more time will be spent in household production. 
2. The higher the wage differential between the individual's own wage and the 
professional wage (the higher the ratio ws / wp), the less time will be spent in 
household production. 
3. The lower the productivity advantage of professional provision (the greater 
the ratio As / Am), the more time will be spent in household production.  
                                            
13  As long as one can assume that households cannot be completely autarkic, the division of 
hours between self-provision and market work will be affected by indeterminate effects of 
the usual labor supply analysis.  
wage-wedge function
a + ws (1-ts) / wp (1+tm+mu)
relative productivity curve
As ln (Am)
household gainful employment
production total hours
worked
8 
For the specific case of the US and Germany, therefore, we can derive the 
following clear hypothesis for the division of time between self-provision and 
market work:  
 
1. Individuals (households) with a high earning potential in markets will spend 
less time in self-provision but more time in gainful employment in both 
countries, i.e. the coefficient for the wage-wedge variable (ww) should be 
negative. 
2. If the incentives summarized in the wage-curve capture the major economic 
incentives for the division of time between household production and market 
work, country dummies -representing variables such as cultural differences- 
should be insignificant.   
III Time-use patterns in Germany and in the US 
Average time-use patterns displayed in Table 1 are influenced by the time 
actually spent in activities and the share of persons participating in these 
activities. The low hours spent in market work for German women may 
therefore be the result of low average working hours for all women or of 
relatively long working hours for a small proportion of women participating in 
gainful employment. Indeed, whereas male participation in market work differs 
only by about 5 percentage-points between the US and Germany, the female 
participation rates differ by more than 10 percentage points. In terms of the 
model presented in section II, more women in Germany seem to have their 
indifference curves touching the productivity curve derived from household 
production (Figure 1). In other words, they undertake only household production 
rather than combining it with market work.  
In the following analysis, the productivity functions are assumed to be 
similar, i.e. in both countries they have the same slope for a given amount of 
time spent in household production across individuals and countries. In other 
words, the ratio of productivity in self-provision (As) over productivity in market 
provision (Am) is assumed to be identical for all individuals and possible effects 
of specialization in market or household activities (Becker 1965) are ignored.14 
This assumption, although probably crude, simplifies the analysis of time-use 
patterns identified by differences in the wage-wedge function between the two 
countries. 
                                            
14  Briddle and Hamermesh (1990) argue that sleep affects productivity, i.e. sleep is subject to 
choice rather than biologically fixed. In this paper, however, the potential productivity 
effects of sleep are ignored..  
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For the empirical analysis, both the wage-wedge function and prices for 
market services need to be identified. Typical market services, which may 
substitute for household production are identified with the industries 'private 
household personal', 'eating and drinking places, hotels', 'personal services', 
'retail trade', and 'other repair services'. The wages in these industries relative 
to the mean wage are remarkably similar (almost identical) in both countries 
(compare Freeman/ Schettkat 2000 and columns 1 and 5 in Table 2, which 
display the inverse of these wage ratios). Thus, the ws/wp-ratio is almost 
identical in both countries (for the mean wage earner 1.6) but taxes and non-
wage labor costs differ substantially between Germany and the US.  
In the US, many low-skilled, low-paid workers receive only the legal 
minimum level of social security and paid vacation is usually two weeks (about 
4% of labor costs). This is much less than in Germany, where paid vacation is 
about 6 weeks (roughly 12% of labor costs, for details see Appendix II). 
However, paid vacation increases both labor costs and the 'net' wage. 
Therefore, social security contributions are most important for the wedge, which 
is estimated to be .68 in the US but .48 in Germany (see Appendix II for details). 
Assuming for simplicity's sake that profits and overheads are zero (or similar), 
the wedge is smaller in the US than in Germany. In other words, the slope of 
the wage-wedge curve is flatter in Germany than in the US, implying more 
hours spent in self-provision in Germany. 
Given this information, an implied slope of the As/Am-curve can be 
calculated (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7, Table 2). As long as the implied slope (As/Am) 
of the productivity curve is greater than one, self-provision will be preferred to 
market provision. For the mean-wage earner, this will hardly ever be the case 
neither in the US nor in Germany, although the odds are slightly more in favor of 
market provision in the US (columns 2 and 6 in Table 2). Of course, the picture 
changes for the higher wage-groups. For those earning one-third above the 
median wage (columns 4 and 8 in Table 2), market provision is more attractive 
than for the mean-wage earner. The implied As/Am-curve slopes are again more 
in favor of market provision in the US than in Germany, but the size of the 
groups earning 1.33 times the median wage are very different in the two 
countries. About 22% of American employees earn at least this amount, 
compared to roughly half that figure in Germany (13%). Moreover, 32% of that 
group in the US are women, compared to only 5% in Germany. Obviously, it is 
more attractive for a larger share of American women to participate in market 
work, compared with German women, who are under-represented among high-
wage earners. Moreover, the proportion of women in this wage bracket has 
more than doubled in the US since 1970, whereas it remained unchanged in 
Germany (Freeman/ Schettkat 2002).  
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Table 2: Implied productivity ratios in the US and Germany  
US Germany 
APW APW * 1.33 APW APW * 1.33 
ws/wp (As/Am) ws/wp (As/Am) ws/wp (As/Am) ws/wp (As/Am) 
services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
personnel priv. 
households 
2.44 1.56 3.64 2.33 2.22 1.00 2.96 1.33 
          
eating, drinking  
places 
1.61 1.03 2.41 1.54 1.59 0.71 2.11 0.95 
          
personal 
services 
1.52 0.97 2.26 1.45 1.89 0.85 2.51 1.13 
          
retail trade 1.43 0.91 2.13 1.36 1.67 0.75 2.22 1.00 
          
other repair 1.11 0.71 1.66 1.06 1.39 0.63 1.85 0.83 
 
Source: ws/wp derived from Freeman/ Schettkat 1999, for taxes and non-wage labor costs see 
Appendix II. 
Using the merged American-German time-use data set, the following model has 
been estimated separately for men and women: 
, ,
1 2 3 4 5 ,
, ,
ln s i j i j
m i j
t
ww controls county ww country
t
α α α α α ε  = + + + + ∗ +    ∑                  (3.1) 
where: ww
w t
w t
s i j s j
p j m j m j
= −+ +
, , ,
, , ,
( )
( )
1
1 µ , the controls are dummies of marital status, the 
presence of children, interaction of marital status and country, the country is a 
dummy (0=USA, 1=Germany). Subscript i indicates the individual wage class, 
subscript j indicates the country, subscript s indicates self-provision, and 
subscript m indicates market provision. Details are given in the appendices.  
Time-use data refer to time-allocation on the day of the interview and thus 
the individual data will have many zeros because not all activities are performed 
every day. However, the major interest is in time-allocation over a week and 
therefore time-use studies create 'artificial weeks', i.e. they construct weekly 
time-use across several individuals. In this study, time-allocation was 
constructed as time-use in various activities for 800 cells per country, which 
were constructed from 200 wage percentiles, gender and the presence of 
children (below the age of 18). Time spent in household production encompasses 
'housework', 'child care', and 'shopping and obtaining services', while market work 
includes hours spent actually working, commuting time, and work-related time, such as 
breaks at work. The ratio , ,
, ,
s i j
m i j
t
t
 will take high values if market time is low and time in 
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self-provision is high and vice versa.15 The logarithm of this ratio, the dependent 
variable, may take values from -∞ to +∞. 
The wage-wedge relationship has been computed for every of the 200 
wage classes, with the imputed individual wage over the professional wage (see 
Appendix II). In other words, an imputed wage has been assigned even to 
individuals not participating in the labor market reflecting the endogeneity of 
time allocation. The wage-wedge variable 'ww' is expressed in relative terms 
and should capture the economic incentives influencing time-allocation, 
controlling for other variables like marital status and the presence of children. 
The wage-wedge relationship is expected to be comparatively high in the US 
but low in Germany and consequently the ratio , ,
, ,
s i j
m i j
t
t
 should be low in the US 
and higher in Germany. The estimation has been performed for men and 
women separately because the majority of men participate in market work and 
because the major differences in market work between the countries occur 
among women. The coefficient for the country-dummy is expected to be zero if 
the observed differences in time-allocation depend on the wage-wedge 
relationship and the controls rather than on differences in other country-specific 
variables such as taste or culture. The results of the regression analysis are 
shown in Table 3. 
                                            
15  The reverse ratio was also used to check whether zeros in the time-use categories may 
affect the results. However, the regression models below are stable with respect to the 
definition of this ratio.  
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Table 3: OLS estimations of , ,
, ,
ln s i j
m i j
t
t
    
 on the wage-wedge relationship, combined US-German data 
independent variables women men 
   I II III IV V I II III IV V 
wage-wedge (ww)  -0.82 -0.79 -0.98 -0.95 -1.03 -0.23 -0.23 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 
   (0.174) (0.175) (0.168) (0.169) (0.182) (0.193) (0.193) (0.196) (0.197) (0.201) 
age    0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
marital status  0.93 1.22 0.41 0.88 0.87 -0.30 -0.14 -0.20 0.09 0.09 
   (0.155) (0.338) (0.168) (0.328) (0.327) (0.158) (0.411) (0.186) (0.458) (0.459) 
marital status * country 1.05 0.67 0.99 0.39 0.38 0.46 0.28 0.47 0.17 0.17 
   (.146) (.402) (140) (0.3870 (0.387) (0.158) (0.461) (0.159) (0.472) (0.475) 
child     0.643 0.66 0.66   -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 
     (0.094) (0.094) (0.094)   (0.113) (0.117) (0.117) 
country    0.31  0.51 0.13  0.16  0.27 0.31 
    (0.316)  (0.304) (0.415)  (0.384)  (0.398) (0.565) 
ww * country      0.52     -0.05 
       (0.393)     (0.515) 
constant   -0.49 -0.79 -0.74 -1.23 -1.1 -1.41 -1.56 -1.38 -1.64 -1.65 
   (0.181) (0.352) (0.177) (0.343) (0.357) (0.171) (0.419) (0.174) (0.425) (0.437) 
             
summary statistics            
n   535 535 535 535 535 514 514 514 514 514 
Prob > F model  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R2-adjusted  30.46 30.45 35.99 36.21 36.31 8.37 8.22 8.37 8.27 8.09 
RESET test for 
specification  
not sign. not sign. not sign. not sign. not sing. sign. sign. sign. sign. sign. 
Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity  
not sign. not sign. not sign. not sign. not sign. sign. sign. sign. sign. sign. 
standard errors in parentheses 
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In the case of men, the models are significant but individual coefficients do not affect 
men's time-use patterns significantly; most importantly, time-use is not affected by 
the wage-wedge relationship and does not differ significantly between the US and 
Germany. The mean of , ,
, ,
ln s i j
m i j
t
t
    
 for men is negative in both countries, that is that 
men spent more hours in market production than in household production.16 
However, as labor supply studies have found in general (Killingsworth 1983), 
women's time-allocation is more sensitive to wages and wedges. Most importantly, 
the coefficients for the wage-wedge relationship show the expected negative sign, 
and are both significant in all models and stable across the models. A bigger wedge 
leads to a flatter wage-wedge curve (a lower ww value) and raises time in household 
production over time in market work. The coefficient for the wage-wedge variable 
remains at similar values if the models are restricted to individual countries. Marriage 
increases the time women spend in self-provision relative to market work in both 
countries but does so more substantially in Germany. This may be the result of the 
fact that the German social security system discourages married women from 
working (see Appendix II). The presence of children increases time spent in self-
provision in both countries. Most importantly, the country dummies are not significant 
in any of the models shown in Table 3. In other words, the differences in labor force 
participation and market provision observed between the US and Germany are 
actually likely to be substantially influenced by differences in the incentive structure 
rather than by differences in culture or taste.  
                                            
16  In both countries the mean of the log of time-use ratio , ,
, ,
ln s i j
m i j
t
t
    
 is negative for men but positive 
for women with substantial inter-country differences in the latter case. In other words, German 
and American women spend on average more time in household production than in market work 
but for American women these two categories almost balance.  
 
 men women 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 US 
ln (ts /tm) 252 -1.20 1.12 275 0.05 1.05 
Ww 290 1.14 0.39 296 0.99 0.31 
 Germany 
ln (ts /tm) 270 -0.74 0.92 267 0.76 1.19 
Ww 279 0.78 0.15 281 0.68 0.16 
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IV  Conclusions 
This analysis of time-use data in the US and in Germany has shown that the 
opportunity costs of time have a significant influence on the time-allocation for 
women. A lower wedge and a wider wage dispersion makes market work more 
attractive and this may actually be the key variable explaining transatlantic 
differences in time-use.  In addition, women are represented a much higher share 
among the high-wage earners in the US than in Germany, that is that for relatively 
more women the decision will be made in favor of market work and market provision 
rather than housework and self-provision in the US. 
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Appendix I: The data 
The data used in this study is based on time budget surveys. The German data are 
derived from the scientific use file (Statistisches Bundesamt 1999) 'Wo bleibt die 
Zeit?'. The data used covers the former West Germany because the special situation 
in East Germany (in 1991/ 1992) may be not representative for time-use. The data is 
representative of German households only; i.e. households of non-Germans living in 
Germany were not included. The data was collected by means of diaries and 
personal interviews between autumn 1991 and summer 1992 and covers about 
32,0000 diaries, representing about 16,000 individuals (each person kept diaries for 
2 consecutive days). In the present study, only the adult population (18 to 64 years) 
is included. This left 17,998 diaries.  
The US data (for details, see Triplett 1995) was collected by the Survey Research 
Center at the University of Maryland and covers the period from September 1992 to 
October 1994. The data was collected by means of telephone interviews. Each 
quarter of data collection was an independent random sample but multiple chances 
of selection across quarters were avoided. Weekend and weekdays were 
distinguished. The interviewees had to list all their activities for the day before the 
interview in a 24-hour diary with detailed activity and location coding together with 
information on demographic background. In households with more than one adult, 
the interviewee was selected at random. A total of 9,386 interviews were conducted, 
6,316 representing weekdays and 3,070 representing weekends. The present study 
has used only the time of adults (18 years to 64 years), leaving us with a sample size 
of 6,062.  
The two data sets have been made compatible with respect both to the time-use 
categories and the period covered (in both countries, the whole year). The US data 
did not provide information on wages and the German data provided only data on net 
household income in the preceding month. For this reason, we estimated the wages 
used in this analysis from wage information available in the CGAS (Comparable 
German American Structural Database, see Freeman/ Schettkat 1999). Although 
wages are only estimated, the advantage of this procedure is that potential wages 
are assigned to those persons who are not actually in employment. The correlation 
between the estimated wage and the net household income for those households 
with a single income was .64 (significant at 1%).   
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Appendix II: Tax and social security systems in the US and in 
Germany (sources: CPB 1995, OECD 1995) 
United States 
In the US, contributions to the pension system are shared between employer and 
employee (15.3%) but other contributions (unemployment insurance, which has a 
ceiling for contributions of around $ 7,000 and varies by state but is on average about 
2.5%, and industrial injury insurance at 2.4%) are paid by employers entirely. In 
addition, there may be non-compulsory health insurance, usually covered by the 
employer but often not applying to low-paid workers. Paid vacation is usually about 2 
weeks per year, which represents about 4% additional labor costs and a similar 
amount of the gross wage. 
Married couples are partly taxed at a lower rate compared to a single person with the 
same income, but the US taxation system is not as generous as an income splitting 
system. For example, in 1995 singles and couples with incomes between $ 89,000 
and $ 115,000 were both taxed at a rate of 31% (OECD 1995). By comparison, a 
splitting system would lead to a tax rate of about 15.5% for a couple but 31% for 
singles. Since the tax rates for singles and married couples largely overlap and do 
not differ substantially, tax rates independent of marital status are applied. The tax 
base in the US includes social security contributions. Individual states and cities levy 
additional income taxes (e.g., in New York State between 4 and 7.9% and in New 
York City between 2.5 and 4.6%). 
 
The net wage is therefore calculated as: 
 
wnet = ws (1 - scs -ts) (1 + vac)  
 
wnet = ws (1 - .25) (1 + .04) = ws * (.78) 
Gross labor costs are calculated as: 
 
glc = wp (1 + scp) (1 + vac) (1 + sales tax) 
 
glc = wp [1 + .077 + .025 + .025)] (1+ 0.04) (1 + .05) = wp * 1.14 
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Germany 
In Germany, social security contributions are shared between employers and 
employees (each paying 19% of the gross income for compulsory pension, 
unemployment and health insurance). In addition, employers have to cover 6 weeks 
of paid vacation (equivalent to 12% of the gross income). Social security 
contributions reduce the tax base in Germany, which is levied at 19% for a tax base 
between DM 5,600 and DM 8,150, and between 19 and 53% (continuously rising) for 
a tax base of between DM 8,150 and DM 120,000. For married couples an income-
splitting system applies with double the tax brackets for a single. In other words, 
married couples are taxed at roughly half the rate as a single person with the same 
income. According to OECD estimates (OECD 1995, jobs study), a single-earner 
married couple pays less tax than a dual-earner married couple with the same 
income (the difference can be up to 8% for low-income couples where both partners 
have the same gross income). This effect is due to the inclusion of spouses without 
an income in social security. Thus, the German tax and contribution system inhibits 
incentives for married women not to work. Under German tax laws, social security 
payments are exempt from taxation. Paid vacation in Germany is about 6 weeks per 
year, i.e. one hour worked represents a value of the net wage times the vacation, 
which is about 12%. 
 
The net wage is therefore calculated as: 
 
wnet = ws (1 - scs) (1 - ts) (1 + vac) 
 
wnet = ws (1 - .35) (1 + .12) = ws * .73  
 
 
Gross labor costs are calculated as: 
 
glc = wp (1 + scp) (1 + vac) (1 + VAT) 
 
glc = wp (1 + .189) (1 + .12) (1 + .15) = wp * 1.53 
Wage-wedge function 
The major difference in the wage-wedge function between the US and Germany is 
caused not so much by the opportunity costs as by the market equivalent costs. The 
wage-wedge function as displayed in Figure 1 was calculated as: 
 
 
ww w
w
w
w
t
t
mean
p
s
mean
s
m
= −+ +*
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( )
1
1 µ  
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where mean
p
w
w
= 1.6 in both countries as derived from Freeman/Schettkat (1999), s
mean
w
w
 
is the individual wage divided by the mean wage, and the data above produces for 
the wedge ( )
( )
1
1
−
+ +
F
HG
I
KJ
t
t
s
m µ  a value of .68 for the US, and .48 for Germany. 
Since the German social security system favors single-earner married couples, the 
decision to work may be influenced by the additional social security contributions, 
estimated to reduce the second income by about 6%. This is taken into account in 
the estimation by reducing 'ww' by 6% for married women in Germany ( .94)ww∗ . 
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Appendix-Table 1: Income taxes and social security paid by employees as % of income 
income in % of APW income income in % of APW income 
66 100 133 200 66 100 133 200 
        
household type 
USA Germany 
          
Single no kids 23.8 25.9 29.0 33.7 31.6 36.4 39.3 41.0 
          
18.8 22.5 24.4 26.9 25.0 29.8 32.3 32.4 single-earner 
couple 
no child 
        
          
8.1 18.8 21.6 24.4 21.3 24.0 30.0 30.6 single-earner 
couple 
2 children 
        
          
24.4 24.4 25.6 26.9 32.8 32.8 35.1 36.4 dual-earner couple 
no child         
          
21.6 21.6 23.3 24.4 30.5 30.5 33.0 34.5 dual-earner couple 
2 children         
source: OECD 1995 
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